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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE E. CHARLTON, 
Pla~ntiff and Respondeut, 
-vs.-
GEORGE L. HACIUJT·T, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
9243 
PRELI~1INARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as they appeared 
in the lower court. 
The numbers appearing in parentheses refers to the 
record. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in appellant's brief 
is incomplete. Additional facts, as hereinafter related, 
we believe, have a bearing on the case. 
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The plaintiff is a resident of Ogden, Utah, and a rail-
road en1ployre by occup«tion (R. 20). The defendant is 
a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, and an insurance and 
stock broker by occupabon (R. 33). 
On the 15th day of February, 1956, plaintiff and an 
unidentified third person were discussing certain busi-
ness matters in the office of a local attorney. At the 
conclusion of this conference, plaintiff \Yas taken by said 
third person to the office of defendant located on the 7th 
floor of the Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah. The purpose of the 1neeting was to discuss the 
proposed sale by plaintiff of his 1948 Willys Jeep Auto-
mobile and a 1951 Korsair 23-foot trailer house (R. 21). 
After the usual introductions, defendant advised 
plaintiff he was interested in purchasing the equipn1ent 
(R. 21). The parties discussed the sale, and defendant 
advised plaintiff if he would sell the equipment to him, 
defendant would transfer to plaintiff 68,333 shares of 
J-A Uranium Con1pany stock. Defendant stated if plain-
tiff would enter into such an agreement, \\:ithin sixty 
days plaintiff would receive more for his equipment 
than if he sold the same for cash (R. 22, 23). Plaintiff 
agreed to the transaction, and the written agreement 
which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit number 1 
was executed. 
The plaintiff transferred to defendant the possession 
of the Jeep automobile and the house trailer. The de-
fendant failed and refused to deliver to plaintiff the 
68,333 shares of stock of the J-A Uranium Company, 
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and as a l'P~ult of such refusal, plaintiff instituted this 
proceeding. 
Plaintiff filed an a1nended corn plaint ( R. 1:!, 13) and 
defendant filed an ans\ver to said an1ended complaint 
( R. 6). In the anS\\?er and at the pretrial conference, de-
fendant contended he was not acting as an individual 
in the execution of the agreement, but as an agent of the 
Ackerson-Hackett Invest1nent Company, a Utah corpo-
ration. Defendant further contended that if court entered 
a judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, 
the amount of damages to be awarded to plaintiff \vould 
be .li1nited to the reasonable rnarket value of the 68,333 
shares of J-A Uranium Company stock at the time of the 
alleged breach of the agreement (R. 17). 
Trial \vas held before the court, without a jury, and 
the court found as Finding of Fact Number One, (R. 47), 
that defendant entered into this contract as an individual 
and not as an agent of the Ackerson-Hackett Investment 
Co1npany. The court further found as Finding of Fact 
K lun ber Three, ( R. 4 7), that on the date of this agree-
lnent the reasonable market value of the Jeep automobile 
was in the sum of $550.00 and the value of the house 
trailer \Yas the sum of $1,500.00. The court further found 
in said Finding of Fact that for a period of 90 days sub-
sequent to execution of said agreement a share of stock 
of J-A Uranium Company had a reasonable market value 
of $0.03 (three cents) per share (R. 48). Based on said 
Findings of Fact the court entered judgment for plaintiff 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
and against defendant in the sum of $2,049.99 (R. 50). 
The entry of this judgment is the subject of this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
'rRIAL COURT DID NO'T ERR IN FINDING DEFEND-
ANT WAS A PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT. 
POINT II. 
TRIAL COURT DID NO·T ERR IN AWARDING DAM-
AGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,049.99. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TRIAL COURT DID NO'T ERR IN FINDING DEFEND-
ANT WAS A PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT. 
In this case, the agreement which is the subject of 
the appeal was signed by both the plaintiff and defendant 
personally. In view of this fact, and the allegations con-
tained in the answer of defendant and his contentions 
at the pretrial conference, the issue of whether or not 
defendant executed this agreement as an agent of a cor-
poration was presented to the trial court for a determina-
tion. At the trial, the court resolved this issue against 
defendant and made a Finding of Fact that on the date 
defendant executed the agreement he did so in his in-
dividual capacity and not as an agent of a corporation. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits that, in view of the 
'vording of the agreement and the manner it was signed, 
the issue of agency was a proper question of fact to be 
determined by the trial court. See Vol. 2 Am. Jur., 
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Agency, Sec. 454, p. 359. The court, having resolved 
this issue in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant, 
the question now presented to this court is ''Thether there 
is any evidence \vhich, viewed in a light most favorable 
to plain tiff, sustains the finding of the trial court. \V e 
respectfully submit the record is abundant \vith such 
evidence. 
Plaintiff testified in great detail concerning the 
facts and circun1stances leading to the ultiu1ate execution 
of the agree1nent. The in1portant portions of this testi-
Inony reveal that plaintiff's initial visit to defendant's 
office was after he vvras advised defendant was interested 
in purchasing a jeep and a trailer house (R. 21). That 
\vhen he vvent to the office, he \vas not a-vvare of any 
Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company being interested 
in such a purchase. That after being introduced to de-
fendant, the defendant immediately confirmed his prior 
information by indicating he could sure use the jeep and 
trailer and he vvanted to purchase them (R. 21). The 
evidence revealed that during the discussions concerning 
the sale, defendant advised plaintiff if he vvould trade 
the jeep and trailer house for stock in a uranium coln-
pany, \Yhich defendant was then offering to the public and 
\\Thich \Vould be delivered to him within ninety days, 
plaintiff would secure a greater monetary return than if 
the sale were for cash (R. 22, 23). That only after this 
suggestion did plain tiff agree to accept 68,333 shares of 
J-A Uranium Company in exchange for his jeep and 
trailer. 
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Another very important point 1n the record is the 
testin1ony hy both plaintiff and defendant that during 
the negotiations prior to the execution of the agreernent, 
the name Ackerson-Hackett Invest1nent Con1pany ":"as 
never 1nentioned, and defendant never advised plaintiff 
he \vas dealing \vith the company ( R. 23, ±2). 
Even after the agreement \\'"as executed, plaintiff 
continued his negotiations \vith the defendant on a per-
sonal and individual basis. Plaintiff testified a fe\v days 
after the agree1nent \vas executed, he discovered the jeep 
autoinobile was in need of certain repairs and suggested 
to defendant it be eliminated from the transaction. 
Defendant again affirmed his position that he needed 
the jeep and wanted to continue in accordance \\"ith the 
original terms of the agreement (R. 23). 
From an analysis of the foregoing testimony, it is 
obvious there is evidence in the record to support the 
finding by the court that defendant executed the agree-
ment as an individual and not as an agent of the corpora-
tion. 
The defendant, under Point I of his brief, 1nakes 
reference to certain rules enunciated in the Restatement 
of La\v on Agency. While "\Ve do not argue \\ith these 
rules, we subn1it they are not applicable to this ease. 
Defendant takes the position that, even in the face 
of the testimony of plaintiff, plaintiff should have known 
he vvas dealing \Vi th the disclosed principal in this trans-
action. In support of his position, he makes reference 
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to certain portions of the testimony. In these references, 
ho,vever, he fails to note the portions of the record 'vhich 
adequately refute his contentions. 
(iounsel states that, because the na1ne _..\ckerson-
Hackett \vas on the door of the office of defendant, this 
fact put hin1 on notice of the existence of the corporation 
and placed a duty upon him to make inquiry concerning 
the corporation. Counsel fails, however, to cite the por-
tion of the record "~here defendant ad1nitted his name \vas 
also on the door in a conspicuous place and separate fro1n 
the corporation (R. ±2). In view of this fact, and having 
in mind the purpose of plaintiff in going to the office, 
"Te submit, plaintiff was under no duty of inquiry con-
cerning Ackerson-Hackett Investment Company. Our 
position is further substantiated by the fact the defend-
ant, himself, during the entire transaction made no indi-
cation that Ackerson-Hackett Investment ·Company 
was to be considered as a party to this transaction. 
Counsel 1nakes reference to the fact the agreement 
between the parties was written on Ackerson-Hackett 
stationery, and the company name was also placed on 
the stock confirmation. Again, counsel fails to note the 
portion of the record where plaintiff testified that, after 
the terms of the transaction were completed, defendant 
requested his secretary to get him a piece of paper, in 
order that these terms could be reduced to writing (R. 
26). We submit the letterhead contained on this piece 
of pap·er was not of such consequence as to place plaintiff 
on any notice he was dealing with a corporation. The 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
in1portance of the piece of paper is limited to its recital 
concerning the terms of the agreement. It is our position 
the immateriality of the stationery is substantiated by 
the fact the corporation designated in the letterhead 'vas 
not noted as a party to the transaction, and the signature 
of defendant vvas not in a corporate capacity. 
\Vith respect to the stock confirmation slip, 'Ye again 
refer to the record, where plaintiff testified that the 
name being on the document "\Vas of no importance be-
cause his concern was whether he would receive the stock 
as agreed by defendant (R. 28). 
Under Point I of his brief, defendant makes the 
further statement there is no testimony in the record 
fro1n which it can be inferred defendant made any proln-
ises to plaintiff. We take issue with this staten1ent and 
contend the testimony describing the conduct of defend-
ant during this entire transaction reveals certain proper 
inferences. 
'There is no argument that the agreement in this case 
was prepared in the office of defendant under his super-
vision and direction. We sub1nit that fron1 these facts 
it may be inferred that, if defendant "\Vere executing the 
agreement as an agent of the Ackerson-Hackett Invest-
ment Con1pany, this fact could have been 1nade clear 
and understandable by anyone reading the agreen1ent. 
If the corporation were to have an interest in this agree-
ment, the defendant could have 1nade it a party to the 
agreement. If the defendant did desire to make the com-
pany a party, he could have signed his name in a corpo-
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rate capacity and on behalf of the corporation. The de-
fendant, however, failed to take these simple measures, 
and we submit the court can infer from these facts he did 
not intend the company to be a party. 
The defendant in this action testified he did not 
know whether this transaction \vere included in the min-
utes of the corporation. Again, we state the failure of 
defendant to complete the transaction in accordance 
with proper corporate management; the court can infer 
the company was never intended to be made a party. 
Plaintiff respectfully submits the trial court, after 
properly weighing the testimony in this case, believed 
the plaintiff and his testimony. The record justifies and 
substantiates our position that the corporation was never 
a party to the agreement. It is our further position that 
defendant's attempt to incorporate the corporation in 
this agreement is a rather shoddy effort on his part to 
obtain the fruits of the agreement without bearing the 
responsibility of paying the agreed price. 
We respectfully subinit the evidence in this case sub-
stantiates the finding by the trial court, and said ruling 
should be sustained by this court. 
POINT II. 
TRIAL COURT DID N01T ERR IN AWARDING DAM-
AGES IN THE AMOUNT OF $2,049.99. 
The defendant in this action admitted he failed to 
deliver to plaintiff the 68,333 shares of stock of the J -A 
Uranium Company. In assessing the damages for the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
10 
breach of the contract by defendant, the trial court found 
that on the date of the agreement and for a period of 
ninety days thereafter, the stock of the J-A Uranium 
Company had a reasonable value of three cents per share 
(R. 48). The trial court, having so ruled, the issue now 
presented to this court is whether the evidence, viewed 
in a light most favorable to plaintiff, sustains the find-
ing by the court. 
Plaintiff testified on direct examination as follows: 
(R. 24, 25) 
"Q. The contract which we have introduced talks 
about par value stock. Did Mr. Hackett say 
anything as to the value of the stock~ 
A. Yes, sir. He said that it had been sold for 
three cents but he said the position of the 
company and everything he was sure I would 
get a lot more than that out of it; that three 
cents was the par value of it." 
The defendant, on cross examination, testified as 
follows: (R. 42) : .. 
"Q. Now this public offering, does that mean it 
vvas offered to the public for buying-? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was being done on February 15, 
1956~ 
A. It was either in the process right then, ~fr. 
Dibblee, or it was about to commence. I can't 
say exactly, but it "\Vas right within that period 
of tiine, yes. 
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Q. But shortly thereafter, 68,333 shares of J -A 
Uranium stock, it was possible to purchase 
those shares f 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if you purchased them you would be 
paying three cents per share f 
A. Right." 
We respectfully submit that the foregoing testimony 
supports the ruling of the court as to the reasonable 
value of the uranium stock. 
Defendant, in his brief, contends the evidence is not 
sufficient for the court to find value of the stock. In 
support of his position, he cites to the court certain 
references enunciating the rule for determining value 
of stock when there is no evidence ·of value. In view of 
the testimony, these authorities are obviously not in 
point. 
There is one portion of the citation which is applic-
able to this case and is worth repeating. In 18 Corpus 
JuriJs Secundum Corporati~on Sec. 415, which states as 
follows: 
"* * * In order that stock may have a market 
value, it is not necessary that it be the subject 
of daily traffic by being bought and sold on the 
streets or in the frequent dealings of trades-
people; it is enough if it is occasionally the subject 
of sale or exchange in the· community so as to 
fix upon the stock at different times .a customary 
price." 
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In applyii,lg the foregoing to the case at bar, we 
. submit this stock has experienced sufficient activity for 
it to have a value. We have not only sales referred to 
by the parties, but also the sale now under consideration 
by this court. In the case at bar, the evidence revealed 
at the time of the execution of this contract the reason-
able value of plaintiff's jeep automobile was the sum 
of $550.00 and of the trailer house the sum of $1,500.00 
(R. 24). Defendant, by his own agreement, computed 
that property having a total value of $2,050.00 was 
equal to 68,333 shares of stock of the J-A Uranium Com-
pany. By the use of simple arithmetic, it is shown that 
the opinion of the defendant supports the finding of the 
court. 
We respectfully submit that the finding by the trial 
court as to the value of the stock involved in this case is 
supported by the evidence and should be affirmed by 
this court. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that finding by the trial 
court that defendant executed the agree1nent as an indi-
vidual is prop·erly sustained by the evidence. That the 
finding by the court that the reasonable value of the 
stock was three cents per share is also sustained by the 
evidence. The trial court, having properly ruled con-
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cern1ng these matters, the judgment entered by the 
court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS and BLACI( 
By RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
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